STATE v. GHINGHER, 165 Md. 330 (1933)

168 A. 122

STATE OF MARYLAND ET AL. v. JOHN J. GHINGHER, BANK COMMISSIONER.

[No. 21, October Term, 1933.]Court of Appeals of Maryland.
Decided July 31st, 1933.

Decided July 31st, 1933.

Appeal from the Superior Court of Baltimore City (FRANK, J.).

Petition by the State of Maryland and by the State Roads Commission for a writ of mandamus directed to John J. Ghingher, Bank Commissioner of the State of Maryland, requiring him to order the officers of the Union Trust Company of Maryland to pay over to the State certain funds on deposit with said trust company in the name of said commission. From a judgment refusing the writ, the State and the State Roads Commission appeal. Affirmed.

The cause was argued before BOND, C.J., PATTISON, URNER, ADKINS, OFFUTT, DIGGES, PARKE, and SLOAN, JJ.

William Preston Lane, Jr., Attorney General, and Carlyle Barton, Special Counsel, with whom were Willis R. Jones, Deputy Attorney General, William L. Henderson, Assistant Attorney General, and John B. Gray, Jr., Special Assistant Attorney General, on the brief, for the appellants.

Stuart S. Janney, for the appellee.

The opinion was delivered per Curiam.

Whether or not the deposits made by the State Roads Commission in the Union Trust Company are moneys of the State, within the meaning of section 3 of article 6 of the Constitution, need not be and is not now determined, since the decision of this court in the appeals (advanced) of Ghingher, Receiver, v. Pearson, o Baltimore v. Pearson, and of Pearson v. Ghingher, Bank Commissioner, being, respectiv ly,

Page 331

Nos. 14, 15 and 16 of the October Term, 1933, 165 Md. 273, 168 A. 122. If these deposits are not such moneys of the State, the decisions in Nos. 14 and 15 deny them priority over other deposits within the meaning of section 71-G of the Emergency Banking Act (chapter 46 of the Acts of 1933). On the other hand, if such deposits are moneys of the State, the decision in No. 16 determines that no priority exists within the meaning of section 71-G. As the petition of the State and the State Roads Commission for a writ of mandamus was grounded on the theory of a priority under section 71-G, and this was denied by the trial court in its dismissal of the petition, the judgment will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.